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May 30,2007
Dr. Rector

On September 11, 1973, Chilean General Augusto Pinochet successfully ousted
President Allende in a coup. Sky-rocketing debt and bad leadership forced the military to

rethink the direction Chile was going. Pinochet ruled with an iron fist and silenced critics
through prison, torture, and even murder. His dictatorship would later lead to human

rights charges by European courts. On October 5, 1988, Chileans voted on whether they
wanted to have General Pinochet remain in power for another 8 years (yes alternative) or
have free presidential elections in December 1989 (no alternative)l. This paper

will focus

on Pinochet's abuses, the yes/no campaign, and how they led to the ousting of Pinochet.
The Chilean people used the non-violent methods of Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr.
as inspiration for their causes. This ultimately led to a successful outcome for the

Chilean people.
When Allende was elected president in 1970 he had grand socialistic ideas for

Chile. His major goal was to unionize and industrialize Chile. He wanted to bring Chile
into the market system of the U.S. and Western European nations. His first step therefore
was to grant all workers a 35 to 40 percent raise, in part to compensate for inflation2.

At

first the policies of Allende had great effect on the country. It seemed that Allende would
be able to back-up the grand ideals that he had stood

for. Unemployment dropped to a

historic low of 3.8 percent, inflation dropped to less than20 percent, and the economy
grew by over 8 percent3. Confidence in Allende would be as high as it would get during

this period. Socialism's failures have been felt throughout Latin American countries.
People like Castro believe the failure is do to the fact that socialism needs to be held

together through a dictatorship.
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The good period of economic growth was short-lived; U.S. economists believe
that too much economic growth can actually be a bad thing. This is because the economy

will outgrow the economic potential a country has. The copper mines had grown, but the
U.S. would be winding down the war in Vietnam and therefore their demand for copper

to be used to make bullets would be lessening. On December

l,l97l

a group of women

organizedthe "march of the empty pots"4. Cracks were beginning to form in Allende's

administration; in August of 1972 some businesses closed their doors in protest. The
Chilean govemment had also borrowed more money then they would eventually be able

to pay back to U.S. and European banks.
The military was needed to try and bring order, Allende made a big mistake in

allying with certain military generals. Although many of his colleagues opposed this
move, on November 2,1972, he named General Carlos Prats, commander and chief

of

the armed forces, to the position of Minister of the Interiors. The problem of this move is
that military generals would later realize they had the power to topple the government.

Mining workers near Santiago would strike for 77 days and were embraced by the
Chileans. Before Allende finally settled the strike 77 days later, it cost his government
approximately 80,000,000 dollars. In June of that yeat a tank regiment gunned down
people in Santiago killing 22 andwounding 326.
There were successes in Allende's term, university enrollment doubled as did

elementary. 235,000 jobs were added, unemployment dropped to 4.8 percent, and the
government increased food imports from 135 million dollars to 5l
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I in 3 yearsT.

However, the borrowing of so much money led to massive foreign debt by the Chilean

government. Political opponents saw moves that Allende made as far to leftist for their
taste. During the years 1971-1973, these "men of law" saw a govemment of the left
shrewdly take hold of legality and the constitution and turn them into the status quo8.
The military had growing animosity toward Allende after he reversed the political
appointments of the generals.

By September of 1973 the military saw that public support for Allende was
waning and that they had an opportunity to seize control of the government. Early in the
day of September 77, 1973, the military left their barracks and occupied most radio

stations. They began broadcasting marches and periodic bulletins that they were
assuming control of the countrye. Allende was being held-up at La Moneda, a
government building and had to know that the game was up.
The military had a massive force assembled; the display of force had little to do

with logistics, Vice Admiral Patricio Carvajal said, "From a strictly military point of
view....to take La Moneda

a company

of special troops would have been sufficient and

a

half hour would have been needed, but setting an example was desired"l0. The show of
force had the desired effect and most people stayed inside their homes during the period

of unrest. The military claims that Allende killed himself, but the likelihood of this is
suspect at best.

General Augusto Pinochet was the man pegged to take over the government. The
exceptional consolidation of power has led scholars to describe the 'oPinochet regime in
terms of 'oone man rule", uncontested control of the "executive army high command" and
t Barros, Robert. Constitutionalism qnd Dictatorship. (221)
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"sultanistic" institutional structure". The brutality of his methods would be felt for the

next l6 years. Dictators believe in strength through one-man rule and those who oppose
this will be dealt with harshly to send messages to others not to oppose the military

leader. Pinochet began hoarding his opponents and intellectual dissidents. He killed 492
people in September,606 in October, 59 in November and 48 in December for a grand

total of 1205 people in 4 monthsl2. Apparently people began getting the message real
fast that this regime would be different then the previously elected

officials. Pinochet

consolidated his power and created a purely militaristic society similar to Fidel Castro's.

Brutality would be his weapon and the soldiers would be his instrument to carry out this
policy.
Pinochet began rounding-up political opponents and dissidents immediately. The

majority of the abuses he committed occurred at the beginning of his reign. A
commission appointed by his successor declared perhaps 3,000 people were killed after
the military coup, Informal estimates, as usual in such instances are higher, but 3,000 is,

for example, little more than a quarter of the number agreed to have been the victims of
state murder in Sri Lankal3. The impact of fear and violence committed by Pinochet

would continue throughout his presidency, but the climate he created was his real tool of

fear. The democratic nation became

a

dictatorship of oppression. In effect, Pinochet

became a metaphor for profound questions about ethics, international law, and foreign

policyla. The human rights violations Pinochet committed would later come back to
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haunt him, but the international community was not prepared to sacrifice any military

intervention.
There were economic improvement during Pinochet's reign, primarily through
economic loans and specializing Chilean products. The shock treatment initially crippled
manufacturing, which shrank by 25% in 1975 before beginning to grow at the healthy
rate of 6 ta 7 percent in the years 1976-19801s. Chile focused on concrete products like

farming, forests, and fish hatcheries. During our winter months it is harvest season in
Chile allowing us to have certain fruits year round. Chilean business was centralized and
controlled by the government. Ironically, Pinochet had slammed Allende's policy of
socializing business. During the late 1970's with credit easily available, Chilean business
owners had borrowed almost 11 billion dollars abroad and were largely responsible for
pushing the nation's debt from 5.3 billion to 17.3 billion dollarsr6.
This was the economic situation in 1980 when the country began to collapse on

itself. More than any other recent military rule in Latin America, dictatorship in Chile is
associated with a single personage, General Augusto PinochetlT. When his reign was

being questioned by the citizens of Chile he put the final touches on his takeover. In
1980 he began his famous military junta to the constitution.

In 1980 this personal power

enabled Pinochet to impose a constitution that perpetrated his rule and included'

provisions that later allowed him to remain commander-in-chief of the army for 8 more

y"urs'*. The provisions were meant to limit outside interference on his rule. His policies
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toward the people of Chile were meant to repress them through not a democratic

constitution, but through force.
Pinochet gambled in eliminating any democratic opposition to his rule, but with
the force of an iron hand he was allowed to get away with

it. The identification

here

of

institutional constraints within the dictatorship, challenges a long tradition in political
theory and comparative politics that holds the two to be incompatible, suggesting a need

to rethink and further research the mechanisms whereby dictatorships structure their

po*er''.

The one-man party system of military rule had once showed strength and

Pinochet used this to put himself completely at the head of the system.
The silence regarding the future electoral system might be attributed to the
standing Chilean constitutional tradition of leaving the regulation of elections to la#O.
Though there was a new Chilean tradition of silence by fear of reprisal. The cracks

would begin to show in Pinochet's reign and the people of Chile would turn to Western
and Eastern philosophies of peaceful protest. However, on March I I , 198 1 amidst great

pomp and ceremony, the constitution went into force. In a private act, Pinochet's closest
collaborators bestowed the tricolor presidential sash upon him2l. The act was a complete
travesty ofjustice and democracy.
The economic policies of Pinochet were based on economic progress through

loans. However, by 1985, there were massive problems with the Chilean economy. The
fact that unemployment pushed 25% (a conservative figure), that Chile was 25 billion in
debt (with interest on the debt consuming 80% of export earnings), that there had been
1600 bankruptcies since 1980 did not mean the government would change their
Barros, Robert. Personqlization and the Military Junta. (6)
'o Barros, Robert. Constitutionalism qnd Dictatorship. (251)

''

'' tuia. lzss;

policies22. It had been a generation since there had been any clear electoral process in a
nation that once praised democracy.

By the end of the 1980's people were fed-up with the Chilean government.

Mother's sons had been taken from their home imprisoned, tortured, and killed. In 1985,
the economy recovered, but the belief the military offered security for private property
was lost. In 1985 the Catholic Church committed its support and leadership for the
democratic campaign23. Pro-democratic sentiment led to a fever pitch, Pope John Paul II
even referred to Pinochet as a dictator. When women began demanding answers to his

policies the police turned hoses on them. In a brilliant strategy the women turned to

Martin Luther King Jr. and Gandhi as inspiration to use non-violent methods for
democratic change. The beating of women projected on the world stage reminded us of
images of dogs being turned on black children in the south.

The famous yes/no vote campaign was a grass roots idea for political change. On

October 1, 1988, a 15 minute T.V. program on the subject aired. Between 80-90% of all
Chileans in urban areas have seen it; about a third watch it every day and another third
occasionally2a. There was an atmosphere of fear, anticipation, and excitement in the air.
There was fear among Pinochet's opponents that the General would use some prefabricated incident to stop the vote count if he realized he would lose the election25.
Pinochet failed to realize the effect the campaign had on the international press and

organizations. The fact that the overwhelming majority of international observers as well
as

the I100 foreign correspondents seem to sympathize with the opposition continues to
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irk the official press and govemmental officials26. Pinochet failed to anticipate the
overwhelming response the cause received from democratic nations.
Many of the people had never voted in a democratic election and there was fear
that Pinochet would take to the streets. However, with the international pressure and
peaceful methods by the opposition he surprisingly let the elections exist. It was a new
independence day for the Chilean people who had suffered so much. Every 350 voters

formed a table, there were 22,131 tables throughout the country, each polling center
housed approximately 50 tables27. There was trepidation by many women fearing a

violent response from Pinochet.
When returns began coming in Chile erupted in celebration, it was a joyous

exhaling of l5 years of repression. The U.S. and Europeans had finally stepped-up to the
plate in support of democracy. The people spoke with their ballots, giving the
Concertacion a victory with 54 percent of the vote to Pinochet's 43 percent28. Th.re

still

*ut

a fear that Pinochet would strike against the people, but the fears proved to be

unfounded. The largest margin of victory was among males and in the cities, 39% Yes to
59% No2e. The great terror of Pinochet was over, but at an immense price of innocent

victims. Ricardo Lagos (Socialist Party) had been the leader of the opposition to
Pinochet. Tears came to his eyes as he reminds us all of the many victims of repression
no longer with us to celebrate this victory3o.

Augusto Pinochet died in 2006 awaiting trial for human rights violations. Lagos
writes,
26
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own way with a functioning international law regime as a back-up instrument against

impunity"3l. There is debate about what to do with men like Pinochet, because it
questions a nation's sovereignty. However, there needs to be steps taken to prevent the

kind of human rights abuses that take place in nations like Chile. Unfortunately, Chile

still has massive debt and unemployment, but people would still prefer to live free than
live oppressed. The abuses that led to the yes/no campaign created an international show
of support. The people rallied in

a display

of solidarity against oppression and violence.

Pinochet is a symbol of the oppressive nature of regimes in Latin America that continue

today. Demonstrations in Venezuela against Hugo Chavez show that there is no shortage
of tyrants in the world. I hope they can take a peaceful page out of the yes/no campaign
and resolve the matter before we have another Pinochet dilemma.
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